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[W]hen the gods wish to punish us, they answer our prayers.1 
 
In January 2014, the Sixth Circuit held that an employee who had 
previously applied for the position to which he was ultimately transferred was 
not disqualified from showing that the transfer was an adverse employment 
action for purposes of discrimination claims against his employer.2 While from 
one perspective Deleon v. Kalamazoo County Road Commission3 merely 
reinforces the standard set forth in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway 
Co. v. White,4 it is a potentially significant decision because it also requires 
employers to reevaluate their approach to internal transfers. 
I. DELEON V. KALAMAZOO COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION 
Robert Deleon, a fifty-three-year-old Hispanic man of Mexican descent, 
had been employed by the Kalamazoo County Road Commission for twenty-
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 1 OSCAR WILDE, AN IDEAL HUSBAND, act 2 (1895). 
 2 739 F.3d 914, 920 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 3 Id. 
 4 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006). 
24 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL FURTHERMORE [Vol. 75 
 
eight years when his employment was terminated.5 In 2008, three years prior to 
his termination, Mr. Deleon had applied for the position of Equipment and 
Facilities Superintendent.6 Although it would have been a lateral move, Mr. 
Deleon hoped to advance his career through the transfer and to obtain a salary 
increase.7 After submitting his application, Mr. Deleon was told that the job 
would not include a pay raise as he had hoped, but Mr. Deleon kept his 
application open nonetheless, interviewed for the position, and then inquired as 
to why he did not receive the position after an external candidate was hired 
instead.8 The external candidate who was hired over Mr. Deleon left the 
position shortly thereafter, and another external candidate declined when 
offered the position.9 Finally, in 2009, Mr. Deleon was transferred to the 
position to which he had applied nine months prior.10 The record indicated that 
Mr. Deleon was not given an opportunity to decline the transfer.11 In the new 
job, Mr. Deleon asserted that he developed bronchitis and other health issues as 
a result of the exposure to diesel fumes.12 Unhappy in his new position, Mr. 
Deleon eventually suffered a “work-induced, stress-related mental breakdown” 
and took eight months of leave under FMLA.13 When his psychiatrist cleared 
him to work again, Mr. Deleon was terminated from his position.14 
Mr. Deleon alleged that the termination constituted (1) a violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause,15 (2) race discrimination under Title VII,16 (3) national 
origin discrimination under the same, and (4) age discrimination under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act,17 each of which would require that Mr. 
Deleon “show that . . . he suffered an adverse employment action.”18 Because 
                                                                                                                       
 5 Deleon, 739 F.3d at 916–17. 
 6 Id. at 916. 
 7 Id. Plaintiff testified that he applied for the position, which was difficult to fill, in 
order to “help out” but requested a higher salary because the new position required 
continuous exposure to diesel fumes. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 10, Deleon, 739 F.3d 
914 (No. 12-2377). 
 8 Deleon, 739 F.3d at 921 (Sutton, J., dissenting). 
 9 Id. at 916 (majority opinion). 
 10 Id. The defendants assert that the transfer was part of a larger reorganization of the 
County Road Commission. Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 9, Deleon, 739 F.3d 914 (No. 
12-2377). 
 11 Deleon, 739 F.3d at 917. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(2010). 
 16 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (2010). 
 17 29 U.S.C. § 621–634 (2011). 
 18 Deleon, 739 F.3d at 918. There are two frameworks to establish a prima facie case of 
intentional discrimination under Title VII: pretext and mixed-motive. 45A AM. JUR. 2D Job 
Discrimination § 526 (2014). The court evaluated this case using the burden-shifting, 
“pretext” framework from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
Deleon, 739 F.3d at 918. Under this framework, the plaintiff must initially show that: 
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Mr. Deleon was transferred to a position for which he had applied, the district 
court held that there was no adverse employment action and granted defendants’ 
motion for summary judgment.19 However, the Sixth Circuit disagreed and 
reversed; examining the transfer from the perspective of a reasonable person, 
the appellate court found that there was evidence “for the jury to consider that 
the new position was ‘more arduous and dirtier.’”20 The majority emphasized 
that, although Deleon had once applied for the position he received, his transfer 
was actually involuntary.21 For the majority, the proper inquiry is not whether 
or not the plaintiff requested the transfer but rather “whether the ‘conditions of 
the transfer’ would have been ‘objectively intolerable to a reasonable 
person.’”22 
In his dissent, Judge Sutton reasoned that when an employer grants an 
employee a transfer for which he has voluntarily applied, with full knowledge 
of the conditions of the position, it is not an adverse employment action.23 The 
dissent agreed that an objective test is correct but reminded the majority that 
“[t]he materially adverse inquiry” examines the “‘reasonable person in the 
plaintiff’s position.’”24 In doing so, the dissent recognized that there may be 
instances where an employee involuntarily requests a transfer, such as when an 
employee requests a transfer under the belief that it is necessary to keep her 
job,25 or when the employee requested the transfer only in order to remove 
himself “from discriminatory conditions in his current position.”26 However, for 
                                                                                                                       
“(1) [the plaintiff] was a member of a protected class, (2) he suffered an adverse employment 
action, (3) he was otherwise qualified for the position, and (4) he was replaced by someone 
outside the protected class or treated differently than a similarly situated, non-protected 
employee.” Id. (emphasis added) (citing Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 707 
(6th Cir. 2006)). The elements are nearly identical for a claim under the ADEA. Id. (citing 
Bush v. Dictaphone Corp., 161 F.3d 363, 368 (6th Cir. 1998)). The elements are also the 
same in this case for the § 1983 Equal Protection claim. Id. at 917–18 (citing Lautermilch v. 
Findlay City Sch., 314 F.3d 271, 275 (6th Cir. 2003); Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 860 F.2d 1317, 
1325 (6th Cir. 1988)). To establish a prima facie case under the mixed motive framework, a 
plaintiff still must show that the defendant took an adverse employment action against the 
plaintiff. White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 400 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 19 Opinion and Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 22, 
Deleon v. Kalamazoo Cnty. Rd. Comm’n, No. 1:11-cv-539 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 18, 2012), 
rev’d, 739 F.3d 914. 
 20 Deleon, 739 F.3d at 920 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 
U.S. 53, 71 (2006)). 
 21 Id.  
 22 Id. at 921 (quoting Strouss v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 250 F.3d 336, 343 (6th Cir. 
2001)). 
 23 Id. at 922 (Sutton, J., dissenting). 
 24 Id. (quoting Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 69–70). 
 25 Id. at 923 (citing Spees v. James Marine, Inc., 617 F.3d 380, 387 (6th Cir. 2010)). 
 26 Deleon, 739 F.3d at 923 (Sutton, J., dissenting) (citing Simpson v. Borg-Warner 
Auto., Inc., 196 F.3d 873, 876 (7th Cir. 1999); Sharp v. City of Hous., 164 F.3d 923, 934 
(5th Cir. 1999)). 
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the dissent, subjecting an employer to liability when it grants a voluntary 
employee request will likely create confusion.27 
II. BURLINGTON NORTHERN REVISITED 
The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Deleon comes nearly a decade after an en 
banc decision by the same circuit in Burlington Northern that held that an 
involuntary transfer could be an adverse employment action if the conditions of 
employment worsened with the transfer, even if the pay was the same.28 
Affirming the Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court in Burlington Northern made 
the common sense observation “that one good way to discourage an 
employee . . . from bringing discrimination charges would be to insist that she 
spend more time performing the more arduous duties and less time performing 
those that are easier or more agreeable.”29 Specifically, the Court in Burlington 
Northern held that a female employee who was involuntarily transferred from 
the position of forklift driver to that of track laborer suffered an adverse 
employment action.30 The Court noted that even though both jobs paid the 
same, the forklift position required special qualifications and carried a certain 
amount of prestige, while the track laborer job was “by all accounts more 
arduous and dirtier.”31  
There is some merit to the position that Deleon’s holding merely repeats the 
Burlington Northern standard: it is an adverse employment action when an 
employee is involuntarily transferred to a position that is objectively worse32 
than his current position. Indeed, the majority in Deleon emphasized that the 
plaintiff’s transfer was involuntary.33 However, the court’s conclusion that 
                                                                                                                       
 27 Id. 
 28 White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 803 (6th Cir. 2004), aff’d, 
548 U.S. 53 (2006). 
 29 Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 70–71. 
 30 Id. at 70. 
 31 Id. at 71. 
 32 While continued exposure to diesel fumes seems to easily meet the “objectively 
intolerable” threshold, it is puzzling that the defendants failed to argue that Mr. Deleon’s 
previous position carried certain unpleasant conditions as well—specifically, that it required 
spending considerable amounts of time outdoors in Michigan. See Brief of Plaintiffs-
Appellants, supra note 7, at 38 (“Plaintiff’s prior position as area superintendent mostly 
entailed working outdoors performing road construction and maintenance.”). Average 
temperatures in Kalamazoo, Michigan hover below freezing for three months out of the year, 
and the average annual precipitation is over thirty-six inches. Monthly Averages for 
Kalamazoo, MI, WEATHER CHANNEL, http://www.weather.com/weather/wxclimatology/ 
monthly/USMI0442 (last visited Apr. 18, 2014). Though Mr. Deleon testified that he 
preferred the working conditions of his previous position, the employee’s opinion “has no 
dispositive bearing on an employment action[’]s classification as ‘adverse.’” Deleon, 739 
F.3d at 921 (citing Sanchez v. Denver Pub. Sch., 164 F.3d 527, 532 n.6 (10th Cir. 1998); 
Doe v. Dekalb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 145 F.3d 1441, 1449–50 (11th Cir. 1998)). 
 33 See, e.g., Deleon, 739 F.3d at 916 n.1 (“Although Deleon originally applied for the 
position, his application was denied. Nine months later, Deleon was involuntarily transferred 
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granting a requested transfer could “still give rise to an adverse employment 
action”34 may understandably make employers nervous. 
III. POTENTIAL CATCH-22 FOR EMPLOYERS? 
 As Judge Sutton indicated in his dissent, the Deleon holding may leave 
employers wondering what they should do when employees apply for internal 
transfers to “more arduous and dirtier” positions.35 After all, it is an adverse 
employment action to reject a qualified individual for a position to which he or 
she applied;36 yet the Deleon holding also suggests that granting the transfer 
may be an adverse employment action as well.37 By allowing plaintiffs some 
flexibility in showing that they suffered an adverse employment action, Deleon 
arguably creates a dilemma for employers. 
A careful reading of Deleon, however, shows a way around this dilemma. 
The Deleon holding highlights the importance of clear communication between 
the employer and employee. To their credit, the defendants in Deleon made the 
employee aware that the position would include exposure to diesel fumes and 
would not be accompanied by a raise before Mr. Deleon interviewed for the 
position.38 However, instead of offering the position to Mr. Deleon and giving 
him an opportunity to negotiate or decline, the defendants merely reassigned 
him.39 By empowering their employees with well-informed choices, employers 
can avoid inadvertently imposing an adverse employment action. This is 
consistent with the majority’s analysis regarding voluntary transfers as well. 
The “certain circumstances” under which the majority imagines a voluntary 
transfer could give rise to an adverse employment action40 are nearly identical 
to those described by the dissent as “not . . . voluntary request[s] for transfer,”41 
such as an application to be removed from a hostile department or an 
application for a transfer in order to remain employed at all. So long as the 
choice is truly—not just facially—the employee’s, an employer should be able 
to grant a qualified employee’s request for an internal transfer to a dirty job. 
Should an employee bring a discrimination claim against an employer, 
defense attorneys still maintain their typical arsenal for success at the summary 
                                                                                                                       
to the position. . . . The dissent notwithstanding, the facts here do not present a ‘voluntary 
application,’ but rather an involuntary transfer.”). 
 34 Id. at 920. 
 35 Id. at 923 (Sutton, J., dissenting) (“An interpretation . . . that subjects employers to 
liability coming and going—whether after granting employee requests or denying them—
will do more to breed confusion about the law than to advance the goals of a fair and 
respectful workplace.”). 
 36 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
 37 Deleon, 739 F.3d at 920. 
 38 Id. at 921 (Sutton, J., dissenting). 
 39 Id. at 916 (majority opinion). 
 40 Id. at 920. 
 41 Id. at 923 (Sutton, J., dissenting). 
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judgment stage. Under the burden-shifting framework, after the employee has 
set forth a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer 
to produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action.42 
Though the Sixth Circuit in Deleon has left open the possibility that granting a 
requested transfer could be an adverse employment action, defense attorneys 
still have ample opportunity to demonstrate that the transfer was the result of 
legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons. Defense attorneys need not place all of 
their proverbial eggs in the adverse employment action basket. 
                                                                                                                       
 42 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The burden then 
shifts back to the employee to show that the employer’s stated reason is mere pretext for 
discrimination. Id. at 804. 
